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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
with their emphasis on securing "the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action," Fed. R. Civ. P. 
Rule 1, initiated a revolution in the litigation process in the 
federal courts in this country. Although those rules were 
not applicable to foreign litigation, they were not without 
influence. It was not surprising that within three decades 
there would be a concerted effort to liberalize the 
procedures in the United States for assisting foreign and 
international tribunals and litigants in obtaining oral and 
documentary evidence in the United States. Eventually this 
effort led to congressional action. Section 1782(a) of Title 28 
of the United States Code now authorizes district courts to 
render assistance to foreign courts and the litigants before 
them in obtaining discovery from United States residents 
for use in foreign proceedings. 
 
Pursuant to that section, Bayer AG, a drug manufacturer 
organized under the laws of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, filed an application in the district court of New 
Jersey to obtain discovery from BetaChem, Inc., a New 
Jersey corporation, for use in a patent infringement action 
pending in the Court of First Instance in Spain. The district 
court denied the application and Bayer appeals. The 
question before us is whether the district court relied on 
inapplicable or erroneous considerations when it denied 
Bayer's request. 
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I. 
 
Facts and Procedural Background 
 
In a related action, Bayer filed suit in January 1992 in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York against Barr Laboratories, Inc., alleging patent 
infringement. Bayer alleged that Barr had infringed Bayer's 
United States ciprofloxacin patent no. 4,670,444 by filing 
an application with the United States Food and Drug 
Administration for permission to sell ciprofloxacin, a broad 
spectrum antibiotic drug. According to Bayer's allegations, 
Barr had purchased and planned to continue to purchase 
ciprofloxacin from BetaChem, which is the United States 
sales agent for Chemo Iberica, S.A. ("Chemo") and its 
affiliate Quimica Sintetica, S.A. ("Quimica"), both Spanish 
corporations. During the course of discovery in that action, 
Barr produced a confidential document that describes 
Chemo's process for making ciprofloxacin. Bayer also 
learned that BetaChem had submitted similar documents 
to the FDA on Barr's behalf. 
 
Apparently as a result of the information received, Bayer 
filed a patent infringement action in June 1993 against 
Chemo and Quimica in the Court of First Instance No. 25 
in Barcelona, Spain, claiming that Chemo and Quimica had 
infringed and were infringing its Spanish process patent no. 
505,138 by manufacturing and selling ciprofloxacin. Bayer 
believed the document it had received from Barr in 
discovery in the New York action was important for its case 
in Spain. Indeed, that document has been referred to as the 
"smoking gun document." App. at 100. Therefore, sometime 
in early 1996, Bayer sought to submit that document to the 
Spanish court. Before doing so, it sought permission from 
the magistrate judge who had entered a confidentiality 
order in the New York action. The magistrate judge gave 
approval, subject to the Spanish court's willingness to enter 
a confidentiality order. 
 
Bayer then approached the Spanish court and on 
October 14, 1996, it obtained an order from the Spanish 
court stating that it would receive "any document that may 
be presented," that it would determine the document's 
 
                                3 
  
admissibility at a later date, and that it would keep the 
document confidential to the extent permissible under 
Spanish law. Thereafter, the New York magistrate judge 
was reported to have signified his satisfaction that this 
order "effectively implements my confidentiality 
requirement." App. at 102. 
 
On December 3, 1996, Bayer filed the pending action in 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1782(a). Bayer alleged that 
it owned patents covering the composition and/or process 
for making ciprofloxacin in numerous countries, including 
its Spanish patent no. 505,138 covering a process for 
making ciprofloxacin; that Chemo and its affiliated 
corporation Quimica infringe that Spanish patent; and that 
BetaChem purchased ciprofloxacin from Chemo and/or 
Quimica which BetaChem in turn sold to Barr. Bayer 
alleged that BetaChem has material information about 
Chemo's process to make ciprofloxacin, and that Spanish 
law provides no procedures for the orderly exchange of 
documents. Bayer sought permission to seek discovery of 
all of BetaChem's documents relating to the process of 
Chemo and Quimica for manufacturing ciprofloxacin, 
including the Drug Master File allegedly containing the 
document that BetaChem had filed with the FDA on Barr's 
behalf. Bayer also sought permission to depose certain 
BetaChem employees. 
 
BetaChem opposed Bayer's application on three grounds. 
First, it argued that discovery requests made pursuant to 
S 1782(a) may be granted only if the material sought would 
be discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction. In that regard, it 
submitted a written legal opinion from a Spanish attorney, 
who stated that under Article 603 of the Spanish Civil 
Procedure Law a Spanish court may, at the request of a 
party, order the disclosure of documents that are the 
exclusive property of a non-litigant if the judge who will 
decide the litigation determines that the documents sought 
would be material to the court's decision. App. at 61-62. 
BetaChem argued that, absent such a determination of 
materiality by the Spanish court, the testimony and 
materials sought by Bayer would not be discoverable in 
Spain and, therefore, are not discoverable underS 1782(a). 
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Second, BetaChem argued that because the Spanish 
action was already sub judice and Bayer had been aware of 
the documents since 1993, Bayer's application was 
untimely. Third, BetaChem argued that the documents in 
the Drug Master File are highly confidential and should not 
be discoverable. 
 
In its opinion delivered orally, the district court, relying 
on our opinion in John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 
132 (3d Cir. 1985), framed its inquiry as whether 
permitting the discovery would "offend[ ] the foreign 
jurisdiction." App. at 94. Although the court stated that it 
did not consider discoverability in the foreign jurisdiction to 
be a prerequisite to obtaining discovery under S 1782(a), its 
discussion nevertheless focused exclusively on the 
requirement under Spanish law of a determination that the 
documents sought from a non-litigant would be material. 
The district court reasoned that even though it would 
probably regard the discovery Bayer sought to be material, 
its own view was irrelevant because it was the Spanish 
judge who was to make the materiality determination. The 
court then ruled that because Bayer had not obtained such 
a materiality ruling, the discovery it sought from BetaChem 
would not be discoverable in Spain and therefore Bayer 
lacked proof that granting its application would not offend 
the Spanish court. App. at 112-14. Accordingly, the district 
court denied Bayer's application and dismissed the action. 
This appeal followed. 
 
On September 1, 1997, while this appeal was pending, 
the Court of First Instance ruled against Bayer in its 
infringement action. Bayer then filed an appeal in the 
Provincial Court of Barcelona. Both parties agree that, 
under Spanish law, the Provincial Court may, under certain 
circumstances, receive new evidence not submitted to the 
Court of First Instance. Accordingly, neither party contends 
that the issue before us has been mooted by the disposition 
in the Court of First Instance. 
 
II. 
 
Discussion 
 
The district court's denial of Bayer's discovery application 
constitutes a final order over which we have jurisdiction 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. See In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 
F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1993). In general, we review a district 
court's decision to deny a S 1782 application for abuse of 
discretion. Where the district court misinterpreted or 
misapplied the law, however, or where the court relied on 
inappropriate factors in the exercise of its discretion, our 
review is plenary. See id. at 58; see generally Redland 
Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 
845 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
A. 
 
Section 1782, entitled "Assistance to foreign and 
international tribunals and to litigants before such 
tribunals," provides, in relevant part: 
 
       The district court of the district in which a person 
       resides or is found may order him to give his testimony 
       or statement or to produce a document or other thing 
       for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international 
       tribunal . . . . The order may be made pursuant to a 
       letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or 
       international tribunal or upon the application of any 
       interested person . . . The order may prescribe the 
       practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part 
       the practice and procedure of the foreign country or 
       the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or 
       statement or producing the document or other thing. 
       To the extent that the order does not prescribe 
       otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, 
       and the document or other thing produced, in 
       accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1782(a). 
 
In adopting the 1964 amendments now incorporated in 
S 1782, Congress liberalized many of the procedures for 
obtaining discovery for use in foreign litigation. The Senate 
Report sets forth the following general statement regarding 
the purpose of the statute: 
 
        Until recently, the United States has not engaged 
       itself fully in efforts to improve practices of 
       international cooperation in litigation. The steadily 
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       growing involvement of the United States in 
       international intercourse and the resulting increase in 
       litigation with international aspects have demonstrated 
       the necessity for statutory improvements and other 
       devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation. 
       Enactment of the bill into law will constitute a major 
       step in bringing the United States to the forefront of 
       nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister 
       nations and thereby providing equitable and efficacious 
       procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants 
       involved in litigation with international aspects. 
 
        It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United 
       States in improving its procedures will invite foreign 
       countries similarly to adjust their procedures. 
 
S. Rep. No. 88-1580, at 2 (1964), reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3783. 
 
Thus, the amendment to S 1782 was designed to facilitate 
the conduct of litigation in foreign tribunals, improve 
international cooperation in litigation, and put the United 
States into the leadership position among world nations in 
this respect. It appears that the scope of discovery is not as 
far-reaching in foreign litigation as it is in domestic 
litigation. The Senate Report makes clear that under 
amended S 1782(a), "the issuance of an appropriate order" 
is left to the discretion of the district court. Id. at 3788. 
That court may refuse to issue an order or may impose 
conditions it deems desirable. The Report further states 
that "[i]n exercising its discretionary power, the court may 
take into account the nature and attitudes of the 
government of the country from which the request 
emanates and the character of the proceedings in that 
country." Id. 
 
In light of the absence of any language in the text of 
S 1782 that limits its application to cases in which the 
materials sought to be discovered would be discoverable in 
the foreign jurisdiction, see In re Esses, 101 F.3d 873, 875 
(2d Cir. 1996), we must examine the basis for the district 
court's exclusive focus on whether the materials sought by 
Bayer would be discoverable in Spain. 
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The inquiry begins with the district court's interpretation 
of John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 
1985), this court's oft-cited opinion addressingS 1782. 
John Deere Limited and Deere & Company (jointly referred 
to as John Deere), which had been sued in Canada by 
Sperry Corporation for patent infringement, filed a S 1782 
application in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking 
to depose Horace McCarty and Emmett Glass, named as 
the co-inventors of the patented machine at issue. McCarty 
and Glass were American employees of Sperry. The district 
court denied John Deere's application, both because 
Canada would not honor letters rogatory emanating from a 
court of the United States and because the material sought 
was not clearly admissible at trial in Canada. Before this 
court had an opportunity to hear John Deere's appeal from 
this ruling, the Federal Court of Canada issued an opinion 
and order directing Sperry to produce McCarty, a Sperry 
officer, but not Glass, a non-officer. 
 
In its appeal from the district court's denial of its 
discovery application, John Deere challenged the relevancy 
under S 1782(a) of the availability of reciprocal foreign 
procedures and the admissibility of the evidence in the 
foreign jurisdiction, the issues the district court deemed 
determinative. We held that neither reciprocity nor 
admissibility were controlling concerns under S 1782(a). We 
stated instead that the "liberal intent to provide judicial 
assistance whether or not reciprocity exists has been 
acknowledged as a primary statutory goal since section 
1782's inception." Id. at 135. 
 
Although we gleaned through the legislative history that 
the district courts were authorized "to scrutinize the 
underlying fairness of foreign proceedings to ensure they 
comply with notions of due process," we stated that it 
would seem to exceed the proper scope of S 1782 to require 
the district court to undertake a more extensive inquiry. Id. 
at 136 & n.3. Indeed, it "would contradict the express 
purpose of section 1782" if the American court were 
required to predict the actions of another country's 
tribunal. Id. at 136. Significantly, we held that inasmuch as 
the Canadian court had held that McCarty's testimony 
would be material and required by the equities, the district 
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court should have required that of Glass as well. Id. at 137- 
38. 
 
In reading John Deere, it is important to recognize that 
because the Canadian court had already held the 
information discoverable, the discoverability issue was not 
before us. Some courts have placed significance on our 
statements that "[a]s a cooperative measure, section 1782 
cannot be said to ignore those considerations of comity and 
sovereignty that pervade international law. A grant of 
discovery that trenched upon the clearly established 
procedures of a foreign tribunal would not be within section 
1782." Id. at 135. We also stated that we would not 
"countenance the use of U.S. discovery procedures to evade 
the limitations placed on domestic pre-trial disclosure by 
foreign tribunals." Id. at 136. 
 
Those comments made explicit our concern over comity, 
but nothing in them signifies an intent to impose a 
discoverability requirement. Such a requirement would be 
inconsistent with much of the language of the opinion, 
where we stated, inter alia, "Nor should the practice of 
Canadian courts in refusing to render judicial assistance, 
be the determinative factor in the construction given 
section 1782 by an American court." Id. at 135-36. In fact, 
in John Deere itself we were satisfied that granting the 
S 1782 application would not have caused any offense to 
the Canadian tribunal, even though discovery from Glass 
had not been authorized by the Canadian courts. 
 
The application of the John Deere opinion by the district 
court in this case is understandable because at least two 
courts of appeals have read the opinion as imposing a 
discoverability requirement. See In re Asta Medica, S.A., 
981 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Request for Assistance 
from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 
F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988); see also In re First Court 
of First Instance in Civil Matters, Caracas, Venezuela, 42 
F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1995) (dictum); In re Crown 
Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686, 
692-93 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same). 
 
In contrast, the Second Circuit read John Deere as we do 
and recognized that the opinion decided only that S 1782 
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does not require that foreign courts have reciprocal 
assistance procedures or that the materials sought would 
be admissible in the foreign jurisdiction. Gianoli Aldunate, 
3 F.3d at 60. That court said, insightfully, "John Deere is 
not a case about whether section 1782 requires 
discoverability, and the court never explicitly states that 
such a requirement exists." Id. It thus declined to interpret 
our general statements addressing the circumvention of 
foreign discovery laws as reading "an absolute 
discoverability requirement into section 1782." Id. See In re 
Euromepa S.A., 51 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 
This case presents us with our first opportunity to revisit 
our opinion in John Deere, and we use the occasion to 
make explicit our view that imposing a requirement that 
the materials sought be discoverable in the foreign 
jurisdiction would be inconsistent with both the letter and 
spirit of the statute. The prima facie showing mandated by 
the statute is only that the application be made (1) "by a 
foreign or international tribunal" or "any interested person," 
(2) that it be "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or 
international tribunal," and (3) that the person or entity 
from whom the discovery is sought be a resident of or be 
found in the district in which the application is filed. See 
Esses, 101 F.2d at 875. If Congress had intended to impose 
an additional element as restrictive as a requirement that 
the materials sought be discoverable in the foreign 
jurisdiction, it would have done so explicitly. See Gianoli 
Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 59 (citing statute's permissive language 
authorizing district court to resort to practice of the foreign 
country). 
 
The legislative history is equally devoid of any indication 
that Congress intended to limit the scope of S 1782 to those 
situations in which the discovery sought would be 
discoverable under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction. In 
adopting the 1964 amendments, Congress's overarching 
goals were to provide efficient means of assistance to 
foreign courts and litigants and encourage other nations to 
return the favor by providing similar assistance to United 
States courts. See In re Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 
97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992); see also S. Rep. No. 88-1580, at 2 
(1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3783. Neither of 
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these congressional purposes requires courts to impose a 
discoverability requirement as a bright-line rule. See 
generally United States v. Ron Pair Enters. Inc., 489 U.S. 
235, 242 (1989) ("The plain meaning of legislation should 
be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably 
at odds with the intentions of its drafters.") (citation & 
quotations omitted). 
 
It is instructive to turn to the Senate Report, which states 
that "[i]f the court fails to prescribe the procedure, the 
appropriate provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are to be followed, irrespective of whether the 
foreign or international proceeding or investigation is of a 
criminal, civil, administrative, or other nature." S. Rep. No. 
88-1580, at 9 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3789. 
In light of the well-known liberality of our Federal Rules, it 
is unlikely that Congress would have painted with so broad 
a brush if it had intended courts applying S 1782 to be 
limited to following another nation's more limited approach 
to discovery. See In re Metallgesellschaft AG, 121 F.3d 77, 
80 (2d Cir. 1997) ("through S 1782 Congress has seen fit to 
authorize discovery which, in some cases, would not be 
available in foreign jurisdictions"). Moreover, if we were 
unwilling in John Deere to condition a S 1782 order on the 
availability of the particular discovery procedure in the 
foreign country, there is no reason why we should make 
discoverability itself a condition. 
 
The policies advanced by the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit as the basis for reading a discoverability 
requirement into S 1782, see Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 5-7, 
are not persuasive. The court expressed concern that a 
foreign party could invoke S 1782 and obtain broad 
American-style discovery while the same would not be 
available for that party's American adversary. Id. at 5-6. In 
essence, that is simply another way of imposing a 
reciprocity requirement, a requirement we rejected in John 
Deere. Any patent unfairness can be dealt with by the 
district court crafting an appropriate discovery order. See 
Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1101. In any event, that 
consideration is not present in this case where S 1782 is 
being invoked against an entity that is not a party to the 
Spanish patent litigation. 
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The First Circuit also based its Asta Medica decision on 
its concern that granting a S 1782 application where the 
discovery sought would not be available in the foreign 
jurisdiction "would lead some nations to conclude that 
United States courts view their laws and procedures with 
contempt," thereby frustrating Congress's desire to 
stimulate foreign tribunals to provide reciprocal assistance 
to litigants before our own courts. Id. at 6-7. We agree that 
"Congress did not seek to place itself on a collision course 
with foreign tribunals and legislatures" and that we ought 
to avoid a construction of the statute that would lead other 
nations to conclude that we do not respect their laws and 
procedures. Id. We said as much in John Deere. 754 F.2d 
at 135. It does not follow that the inability to obtain 
discovery means that the foreign court objects to the 
inquiry. In many of such situations it may signify merely 
the unavailability of an applicable procedure. 
 
It appears that the decision in Asta Medica was based on 
the unavailability of pretrial discovery from non-party 
witnesses in the countries in which the foreign patent 
litigation was pending. Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 6-7. 
However, there is no reason to assume that because a 
country has not adopted a particular discovery procedure, 
it would take offense at its use. Professor Hans Smit, one 
of the principal forces behind the 1964 revisions toS 1782, 
has stated, "although a foreign court might not compel 
production of the evidence in the manner employed by an 
American court, it might very well, and ordinarily would, 
readily accept and rely on the evidence obtained with the 
help of the American court." Hans Smit, Recent 
Developments in International Litigation, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 
215, 236 (1994). In John Deere, we declined to preclude the 
testimony merely because "the Canadian court may 
question its own power to devise and grant an order for the 
discovery of a corporate employee resident outside its 
jurisdiction." John Deere, 754 F.2d at 138. 
 
The opinion of the House of Lords in South Carolina Ins. 
Co. v. Assurantie Maatschappij "De Zeven Provincien" N.V., 
[1987] 1 App. Cas. 24 (1986) (appeal taken from Court of 
Appeal), is informative. There, a party involved in a re- 
insurance lawsuit pending in the English Commercial Court 
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filed a S 1782 application in the Western District of 
Washington seeking to obtain discovery from two Seattle- 
based companies not parties to the English litigation. 
Before the application could be heard, the Commercial 
Court enjoined the parties before it from pursuing the 
application on the ground that "the English court should 
retain the control of its own procedure and the proceedings 
that are before it." Id. at 34. On appeal, the House of Lords 
reversed. 
 
First, it found that the availability of discovery under 
S 1782 posed no "interference with the [English] court's 
control of its own process." Id. at 41. Despite the court's 
inability to compel the discovery, the information could be 
obtained by a party if the possessor voluntarily produced it. 
Thus, the mere fact that the English court could not compel 
the production at issue did not mean that it would be 
offensive to the court if a party obtained it. See id. at 42. 
 
Second, the House of Lords rejected the argument that by 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the English court, the 
parties were bound to accept its procedures. See id. It held 
that the parties to an English litigation were entitled to 
prepare their case by obtaining documents in a foreign 
country and this included the right to seek discovery under 
S 1782. See id. Moreover, because England's proscription of 
discovery from parties not before the court was intended to 
protect the non-parties rather than the litigating parties, it 
would make little sense to extend the protection of the 
English courts to American non-parties subject to discovery 
under the laws of the United States. See id. Finally, the 
House of Lords rejected the notion that resort to American 
discovery procedures would cause increased cost and delay. 
It reasoned that such effects were essentially self-imposed 
by the party's decision to oppose and fight a S 1782 
application. Id. at 42-43. 
 
The analysis used by the House of Lords, reflecting as it 
does the view of a foreign country with less liberal discovery 
procedures and applied in a real case, is an effective 
response to the First Circuit's assumption that a grant of 
discovery not available in the foreign jurisdiction would 
offend that jurisdiction's courts. 
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Of course, we recognize that there are some instances in 
which permitting discovery of certain evidence may cause 
offense to the courts of the foreign jurisdiction. Some 
countries may regard information held by spouses or 
children to be privileged; others may have different limits. 
The comity concerns we expressed against "use of U.S. 
discovery procedures to evade the limitations placed on 
domestic pre-trial disclosure by foreign tribunals," John 
Deere, 754 F.2d at 136, are applicable only when the 
substance of the discovery is objectionable. See generally 
Metallgesellschaft, 121 F.3d at 80 ("If district courts were 
free to refuse discovery based upon its unavailability in a 
foreign court . . . , S 1782 would be irrelevant to much 
international litigation, frustrating its underlying 
purposes."); Hans Smit, Recent Developments in 
International Litigation, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 215, 234-38 
(1994) (discussing Congress's intention to make discovery 
available where the same would not be discoverable under 
foreign law). It follows that the lack of a finding of 
discoverability is an inadequate basis on which to deny a 
S 1782 application. 
 
B. 
 
The reference in S 1782 to the Federal Rules suggests 
that under ordinary circumstances the standards for 
discovery under those rules should also apply when 
discovery is sought under the statute. Consistent with the 
statute's modest prima facie elements and Congress's goal 
of providing equitable and efficacious discovery procedures, 
district courts should treat relevant discovery materials 
sought pursuant to S 1782 as discoverable unless the party 
opposing the application can demonstrate facts sufficient to 
justify the denial of the application. In determining whether 
the foreign tribunal would take offense, the district court 
would be free, in the exercise of its discretion, to consider 
any materials, typically statutes or case law from the 
foreign jurisdiction, that may be presented by the parties. 
Cf. Hans Smit, American Assistance to Litigation in Foreign 
and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the 
U.S.C. Revisited, 25 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 1, 14 (1998) 
("when a foreign or international tribunal has ruled that 
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production of the evidence pursuant to Section 1782 would 
not be appropriate, an American court should heed that 
ruling and deny the application"). 
 
In this case, however, the district court concluded, 
without any evidentiary showing, that granting the 
requested discovery would be offensive to the Spanish 
tribunal. When pressed at oral argument for an explanation 
why the Spanish court would be offended by the grant of 
Bayer's S 1782 application, counsel for BetaChem argued 
only that Bayer could have gone to the Spanish court to 
seek production of the BetaChem materials before coming 
to the United States and invoking S 1782. This fails to 
answer the question. Indeed, a "quasi-exhaustion 
requirement" of the kind advocated by BetaChem on appeal 
has been rejected by those courts that have addressed it. 
See, e.g., Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d at 100. 
 
In fact, the evidence presented to the district court 
strongly suggested receptivity by the Spanish court to the 
evidence sought by Bayer rather than offense. In dealing 
with different documents but of a similar type, Judge Amigo 
of the Court of First Instance issued a ruling on October 
14, 1996, in Bayer's patent infringement action that the 
court would receive "any document that may be presented," 
although he reserved decision as to any document's 
admissibility. App. at 87-89. For its part, BetaChem 
produced no evidence from which the district court might 
have reasonably concluded that presentation of the 
material sought here would offend the Spanish court. 
Inasmuch as relevant evidence is presumptively 
discoverable under S 1782, the burden of demonstrating 
offense to the foreign jurisdiction, or any other facts 
warranting the denial of a particular application, should 
rest with the party opposing the application, here 
BetaChem. 
 
In John Deere, we considered the testimony sought there 
to be discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction after noting 
simply that "the testimony sought would generally be 
subject to discovery were all the parties in Canada." 754 
F.2d at 136 (emphasis added). Here, the parties' 
uncontested submissions make clear that the documents 
sought by Bayer would be subject to discovery in Spain 
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were all the parties located there. By insisting that the 
Spanish court make the materiality determination, the 
district court, in our view, insisted on too much. See 
generally, Metallgesellschaft, 121 F.3d at 80 (denying an 
application "because the foreign court had notfirst passed 
on the discoverability of the material sought" would 
contravene S 1782's purpose). 
 
III. 
 
Our discussion is not intended to suggest that Bayer is 
necessarily entitled to have its application granted. That 
determination will have to await the district court's proper 
exercise of its discretion on remand when it will be free to 
consider the relevance of factors not before us, such as the 
timeliness of Bayer's application and appropriate measures, 
if needed, to protect the confidentiality of the materials. For 
the reasons discussed above, we will vacate the order of the 
district court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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